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United Nations Collective Security and the United States
Security Guarantee in an Age of Rising Multipolarity:
The Security Council as the Talking Shop of the Nations
Kenneth Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION: POSTULATING THE RISE OF A MULTIPOLAR
WORLD
Two interrelated theses are these days much in vogue. One is the thesis of
US decline and, by corollary, the rise of new Great Powers and multipolarity.
Though this thesis is in vogue today, it has been a favorite of writers, politicians,
and statesmen over generations-almost a parlor game for intellectuals. It is a
parlor game that tends, however, to turn historians into futurists. Proceeding
from the unimpeachable, but also uninformative, observation that no empire in
the course of history has lasted forever, thence to the claim that the American
empire is teetering-these analyses have a predictive track record as poor as they
are undeniably popular. The eminent Yale historian Paul Kennedy, for example,
skewered himself in 1987 with a sweeping, best-selling foray into American
decinism, a mere matter of months, as it happened, before the fall of the Soviet
Union.' It curiously did not hurt his reputation or book sales; The Rise and Fall of
Great Powers has been translated into twenty-three languages and counting.
But Kennedy is hardly alone, and the phenomenon owes something (it is
hard to resist concluding) to the schadenfreude of intellectuals for whom the
persistence of American power, although not really so long by historical
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standards, is something of an embarrassment, a bit of vulgarity upon the
propriety and decorum of history. Today's financial crises and recession are
likely to spur more such talk. Historian Nial Ferguson has said as much, largely
on the basis of American indebtedness to China, among America's (and
Americans') long list of other creditors.' Ruminations on historical parallels
between present economic troubles-the crisis in American mortgage finance,
credit default swaps, Fannie and Freddie-and those of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century France-John Law and Louis XIV and, eventually,
hyperinflation, default, bust, ending finally in Revolution and rolling royal
heads-3 -raise the question of whether we are seeing financial portents of the fall,
at long last, of American imperial military and political power.
For all one knows, this might turn out finally to be the moment when the
prophecies come true. Current events disincline to optimism, let alone
Pollyanna. Indeed, the arguments from financial and economic weakness are
broadly persuasive. The path from financial crisis to economic decline to military
decline and Great Power overstretch, viewed within a frame of a few years
rather than across centuries, risks unwarranted specificity for economic
determinism in history. Still, the Duc de San Simon was surely not wrong to
observe that the ability of the British crown to borrow to finance its wars at a
fraction of the rate charged to Louis was not irrelevant to the outcome.4
From a purely academic standpoint, one counsels historians to hold their
fire until the future has become the past. Waiting to pronounce decline in
hindsight is the scholarly prudence otherwise known as the discipline of
"history" rather than "futurism." Yet it is equally true that leaders of men and
women and states and nations, their advisors and policymakers, cannot wait to
act upon history: they, and we, must be futurists.
By contrast, today's second popular thesis is the rise of new powers: not of
a new superpower, but of new Great Powers, new regional powers, new local
powers and, as a result, the emergence of a "multipolar world." The charter
members of the club of rising new powers are, naturally, China and India. Later
on this Article will describe them as "rising production powers." They are
supplemented by a group of rising new powers often described as the new
petroleum autocracies, but more precisely as "resource extraction democratic
2 Niall Ferguson, What "Chimerica" Hath Wrought, 4 The American Interest 3 Oan-Feb 2009).
3 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial Histogy of the World 119-37 (Penguin 2008);
Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost:A History of Finandal Speculation 152-73 (Plume 2000).
4 See James Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots of Democray 192-93 (Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux 2003) (the Duc contrasting England, "whose finances are controlled by those
alone who furnish them, and who only furnish as much as they please," with "absolute" but
"weak" France, and the profound implications for the financing of war between them).
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authoritarians"-with much packed into each descriptive term. The most
important members are Russia and Venezuela. These rising new powers are,
however, tightly bound to the existing Western powers, and to the superpower,
through globalization and markets. The new "production powers" depend
utterly upon American consumer demand, even as America depends upon their
savings; and the "resource extraction powers" are tied to today's notably volatile
global commodities markets.
This second thesis is one contrasting absolute and relative power. Although
it implies less American power relative to the constellation of new rising powers,
it does not commit itself to the claim of absolute American decline. American
decline might or might not be true; what is true, the thesis says, is the rise of new
powers. As a thesis emphasizing rise and agnostic on decline (and most
persuasively laid out by Fareed Zakaria in his recent book, The Post-American
World), it is far more defensible than the thesis of American decline on the
evidence actually available today.5
This Article will not review the evidence for either of these theses. Instead,
it will take by assumption that the second, the rise of new powers, is strongly
true. And it will take by assumption that the first, American decline, is at least
weakly, and gradually becoming, true. The question is what follows from those
assumptions, with respect to the interactions of three institutions-the US, the
UN, and the UN Security Council. The Article is partly predictive of what the
likely consequences of such changes will be-global security and the UN in a
"multipolar world," a world of rising new powers in competition with each other
and with the US-with special emphasis on the role of the Security Council. It is
also partly policy advice to the US government on how it should understand and
address such possible-and in the case of rising powers, currently occurring-
changes in the world security order with an emphasis on key institutions under
international law. It is, in other words, an Article in unabashed futurism.
The argument begins with a statement of UN collective security as
traditionally understood under the history of the UN Charter. It draws a
distinction, however, between collective security understood as "mutual
assistance" and collective security understood as "collective altruism," and
points out the differences in the long-discussed collective action-failure
problems that arise in each. The discussion then turns to ask why, given the
propensity of such collective action-failures, the UN collective security system
does not simply break down and go the way of the League of Nations and other
such efforts. The suggested answer is that a constituency of key players does not
rely on UN collective security and need not worry for themselves about the
promise, or lack thereof, of collective security. These players, starting with
5 See generally Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (W.W. Norton 2008).
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") members, rely upon the US's
post-World War II role, which guarantees the security of a wide array of
countries in a cascade of stronger-to-weaker ways, starting with NATO at the
"top." Even countries that do not directly benefit from the NATO-style US
security guarantee nonetheless benefit from the security provided by the US,
including, for example, the freedom of the seas.6 The argument then walks
through the range of countries that do not benefit strongly from the US security
guarantee, and the way in which UN collective security is, really, their only
option.
The Article then turns to ask what happens in a world in which rising new
powers alter this equilibrium, particularly with reference to the role of the
Security Council. The Article suggests three ways to think about the role of the
Security Council in relation to security arrangements in the world: the Security
Council as, in Kofi Annan's phrase, the "management committee of our
fledgling collective security system"; the Security Council as a "concert of the
Great Powers" who at least sometimes come together, when their interests do
not greatly clash, to establish and maintain order in the world; or the Security
Council as a "talking shop of the Great Powers," the place for diplomacy and
debate in a multipolar world of increasingly competitive powers. The argument
is that each of these modes corresponds to certain security arrangements-but
that in a world in which the new rising powers are increasingly competitive, the
Security Council is increasingly likely to be a "talking shop of the nations."
Discussion then turns to a specific issue-reform of the Security Council to
reflect the alterations of power of the twenty-first century.
The Article ends with policy lessons for the US in dealing with the Security
Council under these new conditions. It observes that those who have longed to
see the Security Council as the world's security "management committee" under
some form of liberal internationalist global governance and who have believed
that this required the diminution of American power and influence-the decline
of the American security guarantee-should perhaps consider that multipolarity
is, as David Rieff has forcefully said, a world not of concert but of competition.
6 See, for example, Lisle A. Rose, 3 Power At Sea: A Violent Peace, 1946-2006 267-83 (Missouri
2007) (examining the contemporary hegemonic prominence of the US Navy on the high seas and
drawing the historical link between its role today with the hegemonic role that Britain's navy
played in earlier times); The National Strategy for Maritime Security 7 (Sept 2005), available online
at <www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf> (visited Apr
22, 2009) (noting the US's commitment to use of its Navy against global maritime threats). As this
Article goes to press, the confrontation between Somali pirates holding a US civilian hostage and
the US Navy has just ended with the hostage being freed by US sniper fire killing three pirates and
wounding another. It is beyond the scope of the current discussion to evaluate what this means
for the US role in maintaining the freedom and security of the high seas, but of course there are
large issues here.
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The possibility of even modest liberal internationalist global governance in
security matters was at its zenith under the American security guarantee, and is
much less likely in a competitive multipolar world.
II. UN COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND ITS DIsCONTENTS
UN collective security was born out of two contradictory impulses. On the
one hand, it began with the realist recognition that collective security must be
enforced by the Great Powers and, as a consequence, must be consonant with
their interests-or at least not too directly contrary to any one of them.' On the
other hand, it internalized an idealist expectation that the Security Council would
gradually evolve as an institution not just of Great Power confabulation, but of
genuine global governance-into what Annan described, as recently as 2006, as
"our fledgling global collective security system."' Sixty years on and yet still
"fledgling" surely ought to raise some intellectual alarm bells. So which is it to
be?
The contradictions were present from the founding of the UN itself. The
experiences of the 1930s, the rise of fascism, the collapse of the League of
Nations, the Second World War-all these and more meant that the "American,
British, and Soviet policy makers who were intent upon fashioning the world
order in 1945... were in little mood for any of the flaccid well-meaning
declarations that, they suspected, had given the League of Nations such weak
legs."9 That can, of course, lead in either of two directions: toward a harder,
more realist vision of security, one set essentially by the terms of the most
powerful or, alternatively, a stronger set of declarations and assertions of
international law and institutions, in effect doubling down on the liberal
internationalist bet. In the end, the framers of the Charter went both directions,
albeit with a far stronger nod (at least compared to the League) to the Great
Powers of the day both in the composition and rules of the Security Council
7 Who is a Great Power? Examining sources that use the term, such as Kennedy's Parliament of Man,
it is a term of art, with not only a shifting membership, but also a shifting meaning, over time; it is
a realist term that has, in the age of the United Nations, a slightly anachronistic ring to it, but a
term that has a resonance today precisely because of the rise of new powers. This is not very
satisfactory, but at least it points out that the term "Great Power" carries layers of history,
anachronism, a delicately veiled realist warning that the world has not transcended Great Power
politics even in the age of the idealist United Nations, and ironies generated by using a term of
apparently antiquated realism to describe the emergence of a new world today. See Paul Kennedy,
The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (Random House 2006).
8 United Nations, To Function More Effectivel, United Nations Needs Far-Sighted American Leadershb,
Secretary-General Says at Truman Presidential Libragy, UN Press Release SG/SM/10793 (2006).
9 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man at 27 (cited in note 7).
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and, indeed, in the Security Council's very existence. What were the realists'
complaints about the failed security system of the interwar period?
For one thing, the League system had been simply "too democratic and too
liberal" as among nation-states.'0 Small, earnest states such as
Finland and New Zealand could make proposals and object to necessary
deals, with results that worked like casting sand into the wheels of old-
diplomacy negotiations. It was one thing for international law to recognize
that all states are sovereign, Denmark as much as the USSR, Costa Rica as
much as the United States; but that democratic tendency had not worked to
deter the aggressors of the 1930s. On the contrary, the evidence was that it
had encouraged the dictators, who observed the League's paralysis, to be
bolder and bolder. 1
Hence the creation of the Security Council itself, explicitly as a gathering of
Great Powers, and with mechanisms designed to ensure that their individual
interests could not be contravened to the point of leaving them with no desire to
support the system. Hence, too, the existence of the veto-the structural feature
of the UN system that perhaps most sticks in the craw of every state that does
not have one-a deliberate rule that might "weaken certain universalistic
principles and compromise the effective response to possible transgressions of
international law where a large nation was involved, but that was a lot better
than no security system at all."' 2
For another thing, the realists of 1945 were highly aware of the "different
capacities... of large versus small states."' 3 It is distinct from the need not to
contravene too strongly the interests of the Great Powers. It addresses the
capacities to act of those who must inevitably be the enforcers of any security
system. What the 1930s taught these realists was that militarily weak countries
like
Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Ethiopia, and Manchuria were inherent
"consumers" of security. They could not provide for themselves, not
because of some lapse of national character, but because they lacked the
demographic, territorial, and economic resources .... By contrast, the big
powers were ... the "providers" of international security-again, not
because of any special virtues of character, but because only they had the
capacity to withstand and then defeat Germany, Italy, and Japan.' 4
Military capacity was a gift of the Great Powers, provided that the matter at
hand was neither too contrary to a Great Power's interests, nor too remote, nor
10 Id.
" Id.
12 Id at 28.
13 Id at 28.
14 Id.
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too expensive. But it also meant tacitly understanding that "if a powerful state
should decide to defy the world body and go it alone, there was little that could
be done to prevent that [from] happening.""5 One function of the veto, from the
standpoint of international law, has been to allow the permanent five Security
Council members to ensure that resolutions of the Council do not go against
them in their core interests as a matter of international law-because otherwise,
over time, the formal international law of the Council (its resolutions) loses
connection to the actual behavior of the very states supposedly establishing it.
Unprincipled, from a legal liberal internationalist view?16 Quite. But realistic, and
a realist fudge that has the capacity to keep international law in the game of
international politics as it unfolds.
The idealist vision of a federation of the world, with the military capacities
of the large nations in the service of collective security, was also deeply present
in the founding of the UN. Despite the apprehensions of important diplomats
who feared that, once again, even with the creation of the Security Council, the
new UN Charter had set too high a bar for "this wicked world,""7 the world's
leaders and politicians, in the opening sessions of the General Assembly and
Security Council in 1946, were far closer to the peroration of Truman's speech at
the opening of the Charter for signature: "This new structure of peace is rising
upon strong foundations. Let us not fail to grasp the supreme chance to
establish a world-wide rule of reason.
'' 8
The Cold War derailed both the carefully calibrated realist calculations and
global governance idealism. The bipolar struggle between the two superpowers
in effect put the Security Council in cold storage for decades as an instrument of
action. The peace that held during those years among the Great Powers and the
superpowers was owed to nuclear standoff and fear of general conflagration as
much as anything. Even the realist structures of the Security Council proved to
have little role in structuring international security in those years.
After the Cold War, hopes surged for the UN and particularly for the ideal
of collective security, epitomized by Bush pere's call for a New World Order
apparently to be based around reinvigorated international institutions, collective
security finally enshrined in the Security Council, even a certain amount of
global governance at last on the horizon. It is hard to overstate the excitement
that many liberal internationalists felt in those heady days of the fall of the Berlin
15 Id at 29.
16 Francis Fukuyama, Beyond Our Shores: Today's "Conservative" Foreign Poliy Has an Idealist Agenda, Wall
St J (Dec 24, 2002), available online at <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/
feature.html?id=1 10002814> (visited Apr 22, 2009).
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Wall. 9 In a perverse sense, Saddam's 1990 invasion and annexation of Kuwait
was a fortuity, at least from the abstract standpoint of evolving global
governance. Because it was so nakedly a violation of everything the UN Charter
stood for, everyone had a reason to object. The situation contained aggression,
territorial conquest, the crudest violations of international peace and security,
internal genocide and crimes against humanity, and even the first large-scale use
of chemical weapons since the First World War, against the Kurds to boot 2°-
everything bad in a single package, as it were; a peg for every interventionist to
hang his hat, and a rationale for every ideal and interest.
The wars of the Yugoslav succession and Rwandan genocide in the 1990s
forcefully brought everyone back to the realization that the Great Powers had
interests, and they also had un-interests. Moreover, it highlighted the realization
that collective security in the Security Council had not magically, with the end of
the Cold War, solved the problem of collective action and free-riding. That
turned out to be true not just of the UN, but even within the presumably much
more unified NATO system.2' After all, NATO could not persuade itself for
many years to intervene in the Yugoslav war in the very midst of Europe, and
only did so when President Clinton decided the political costs of leaving it to the
"hour of Europe', 2  required the US to reach past European dithering and use
military force as an assertion of American interests in which Europe was invited
to join.23 Adam Roberts and Dominick Zaum define collective security as a
system in which each state "accepts that the security of one is the concern of all,
and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the
peace.' '?4 Provided that the system's members share a reasonably common view
of what represents a threat and breach to the peace, this ideal is desirable, of
course. But even on its own assumptions, collective security faces daunting and
19 George H. W. Bush, Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and
the Federal Budget Deficit (Sept 11, 1990), available online at
<http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pubicpapers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9>
(visited Apr 22, 2009).
20 Edward Wong, As Trial Nears, Poison Attack Haunts Kurds, NY Times Al (Aug 21, 2006).
21 See generally Kenneth Anderson, Il#beral Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of Yugoslavia and the Rise of
Multiculturalism in the United States, 33 Va J Intl L 385 (1993).
22 Jacques Poos, Foreign Minister of Luxemburg, coined this term during the Yugoslavia peace
negotiations in 1991. See <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-
coverage-2006/july-2006/european-leaders-face-knifes-edge-in-mideast/> (visited Apr
22, 2009).
23 See Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, American between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The
Misunderstood Years between the Fall of the Berhn Wall and the Start of the War on Terror 125--38
(PublicAffairs 2008).
24 Adam Roberts and Dominic Zaum, Sekective Security: War and the United Nations Secuniy Councl since
1945 11 (Routledge 2008).
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well-understood problems of execution, in theory as well as practice. Those
familiar problems need little restatement.
25
Collective action is premised upon promising to commit to the common
enterprise. If those promises are believed (in the absence of any overarching
enforcement mechanism), then other members rely upon those promises. When
the moment for action comes, however, the member might defect and abandon
its promises. The enterprise might collapse on that basis-or it might succeed
still, and the defecting member has been able to free-ride upon the efforts of
others. In a collective security game of several "rounds," potential participants
will have to evaluate the promises made by others, and decide whether the
possibility of defection renders the common enterprise fruitless, or whether the
possibility of future rounds might persuade possible free-riders to fulfill their
promises. In whichever way the many versions of collective action games are
worked out, the fundamental problems for the game theorist to solve are those
of easy insincere promising, easy or fundamentally cost-free defection, the
strong potential for free-riding, ensuing moral hazard, and copy-cat behavior.26
These are problems, moreover, in which the fundamental goal of collective
security and its shared desirability are not at issue-goals are shared and interests
not fundamentally in conflict. There are versions of collective action games in
which compliance is easier to achieve than others-iterative games, for example,
involving potential reputational costs and benefits. But no one doubts that, quite
apart from anything else, UN collective security through the Security Council is
subject to an enormous, crippling even, disability in the form of collective
action-failure problems.
Given the profound collective action problem for UN collective security
through the Security Council, why does the system persist, even merely as a
formality? Why do the forms of diplomacy and rules persist after all these
decades? One response is that all that exists are formalities on paper, so what is
there to abolish? There are provisions on paper dating back to 1945. But these
paper provisions are not quite formalities, because none of the actual
administrative machinery envisioned for collective security by the paper
provisions of the Charter (for example, a UN standing force) has ever existed
even as mere administrative formalities, let alone as weak actualities. What's to
abolish? Abolish the administrative formalities? They have never been brought
forth from the paper provisions of the Charter.
25 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford
2008).
26 For a persuasive argument that legal scholarship focuses far too much on one variety of game-
the Prisoners' Dilemma-to the neglect of other kinds of games, see Richard H. McAdams,
Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S Cal L Rev 2 (2009).
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A further answer is simply that although the system does not actually
provide collective security, the costs of defecting from it are not irrelevant. For
example, defection might be understood to be signaling information about one's
view of other things that do matter. And perhaps the formalities do provide
benefits to various parties by providing a reasonably international public forum
in which to argue security issues, a forum that provides certain procedural
structures that help shape the underlying terms of debate. That might also be
true even of certain substantive international legal rules, such as the prohibition
on the use of force; even when they are not observed, or observed in breach,
they provide a structure of argument, rhetoric, and debate that itself helps
constrain uses of force, at least compared to a normative setting that refused
even rhetorically to set any bounds.
Still, arguments about security, and having a place for "the collective" to
hold such arguments, are different from actually providing collective security.
Since the collective security is not actually provided (or at least not very
effectively), whereas the forum for talking is, perhaps the implication is that the
collective security needs of nation-states are overstated, and the territorial
integrity of countries today is actually greater than one might have thought. Or
perhaps the UN mechanisms persist because they provide some "talking shop"
benefits-structuring the debate-even if everyone knows one should not count
on collective security actually to provide security, and only the improvident or
imprudent would do so.
But even given all these reasons to wonder about its persistence, it is hard
not to ask why states cling so strongly, at least in their formal statements and
representations, to a system that does not do what it proposes to do. Why no
deep movement to get beyond the stasis of UN collective security and make it
mean something more than it currently does? Save around the edges that
constitute peacekeeping missions and associated activities, the system is in deep
paralysis as regarding collective security for the world as a whole, for what
Kennedy describes as the "consumers" and "producers" of security. Twenty
years since the end of the Cold War, why has the system not evolved by now
into something different, or seen something else move to replace it? Why has it
not institutionally blown itself up, or withered away, or something?
III. THE US SECURITY GUARANTEE AND THE PARALLEL UN-
US SECURITY SYSTEMS
Roberts and Zaum suggest that the answer lies in understanding that the
system, under the aegis of the Security Council, has never been about collective
security as such. Call it what you like, it is a system not of collective security, but
selective security. "[A]lthough the UN provides a framework for states to
collectively address, and take action on, certain wars and crises, it does not-
Vol. 10 N\o. 1
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indeed cannot-do so for all."2  The evidence for this proposition is
incontrovertible, of course; what matters is whether this is part of the system as
it stands or a problem for it. Is it a bug or is it a feature? Roberts and Zaum
suggest that although this selectivity is "generally seen as a problem, and as a
challenge" to the Security Council's legitimacy, a close reading of the Charter
shows that selectivity is built into the UN framework.28 It was built in from the
beginning, they urge-and that is more than simply a political reality, but also a
legal one. Selectivity, in a praxis combining rules and behavior, is able to provide
stability to an otherwise only questionably stable collective security system.
Collective security is stable within the UN system because the system is selective
about what it undertakes, and this selectivity has both a practice and Charter-
based aspect to it.
It is true that such a proposition risks becoming tautological or
nonfalsifiable. Collective security at the UN is stable because the Security
Council only undertakes such collective security as will not destabilize it-
defined, however, as merely that which has not destabilized it. Roberts and
Zaum avoid the temptations of easy proof by fiat, and provide both empirical
criteria to show conditions under which the Council is likely and successfully to
act, and a structure of rules-selectivity rules-that support the empirical
criteria. They are almost certainly correct in the broad selectivity thesis. Yet the
thesis of selective security is insufficient internally, as it were, to explain the
persistence of the UN collective security as it currently exists. But what else is
there?
UN collective security analyses are peculiar, with respect to the actual
condition of world politics, in that they tend to treat the problem of collective
action in UN collective security as though it really were about the world as a
whole, and collective security as a systemic whole. This can be seen in how they
treat the US in the account of UN collective security. Everyone admits, of
course, that the US is the superpower, even if it is a superpower discovering its
own limits. Its military spending still outpaces that of the next dozen or so taken
together, and so on. But that fact is taken as simply reflective of a large,
overwhelmingly, dominatingly, even hegemonically large player, but still a player
within the collective security system.29
27 Roberts and Zaum, Selective Security at 7 (cited in note 24).
28 Id at 8.
29 See, for example, Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimagy and Power in the United Nations Security Council
174-93 (Princeton 2008); Roberts and Zaum, Selective Securiy (cited in note 24); Kennedy, The
Pariament of Man at 51 (cited in note 7); Ramesh Thakur, The United Naions Peace and Securioy: From
Colkcive Securiy to the Responsibliy to Protect 49 (Cambridge 2006); United Nations, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
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As Ramesh Thakur, a UN Assistant Secretary General, put the relationship,
if the "UN is the font of legitimate international authority, the USA has
unparalleled capacity for the maintenance of international peace and security."
30
Capacity unparalleled within the UN collective security system that, Thakur says,
echoing many others, is the source of legitimacy; the task of international
diplomacy is to capture the US and its capacities within that system. Even when
the superpower elephant breaks the rules and treats the rules as inapplicable to
it, the US is still a player within the collective action system. The distorting
effects of a superpower actor within UN collective security systems, the Security
Council structure, all the rest-yes, all those effects are accepted de facto. Yet
the account of collective security still insists on treating it as a single system.
Why does this matter? Because in this case, UN collective security-the
frame expressed by all these analyses and more-has to address collective
action-failure problems as problems of the world system. It can appeal to
internal selection criteria in order to try and confine the system to something
realistically within its abilities, but one might think that the demands of collective
security still could not overcome the burdens without something more.
Otherwise, UN collective security goes the way of the League. What will
overcome the problems of insincere promising, easy defection, free riding, and
moral hazard? Perhaps the answer is to look outside the system, stop treating it
as a unitary one, and look for a solution from without.
So perhaps a better answer would be to say that the persistence of the
system lies more fundamentally in something not captured by treating the US,
today's superpower, as merely a dominant actor within a unitary security system.
Treating the security system as unitary, even with (during the last fifteen years) a
hegemonic actor, obscures a vital matter-one crucial to explaining the
persistence of the forms of the collective security system despite the collective
action problems, and the one crucial to explaining both why the system remains
in deep stasis as a collective security system and yet does not simply implode and
go out of existence altogether.
The truest description of the international security situation since 1990 is,
in fact, quite different. It is actually two systems-the UN and US security
systems-operating in parallel while conjoined at several points. There is a weak
one, the UN collective security apparatus, and there is a strong one, the US
security guarantee. Understood this way, the US is not merely a, or even the,
dominant and most powerful actor within a system of security either collective
or selective. Rather, the US offers a genuinely alternative system of international
Change (2004), available online at <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf> (visited Apr
22, 2009).
30 Thakur, The United Nations Peace and Security at 49 (cited in note 29).
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peace and security that is separate from the role it also plays as a dominant actor
within the UN collective security apparatus of the Security Council. 31
The dominant actor's willingness to extend a security guarantee to a sizable
portion of the planet, explicitly and implicitly, alters the meaning, necessity, and
quality of collective security at the UN itself. These are two fundamentally
different game-theory scenarios: on the one hand, a dominant actor within a UN
collective security-defection international relations "game"; on the other hand,
an actor that offers its own security package alongside that of the UN in a
parallel collective security game. In a diplomatic system characterized by
insincere public promises, easy defection, moral hazard, and free-riding, the fig
leaf is assiduously maintained that the UN constitutes, or anyway offers, a
collective security system. Whereas in fact, most leading players in Europe, Asia,
and Latin America, and even the Middle East, are unwilling to test the strength
of that system: countries pay insincere lip service to the UN system, while
actually relying on the US system.
For all the extant elite complaining and populist anti-Americanism, a
remarkable number of countries have counted the costs of adherence to the US
security promise and found it rather better than their own, and better than the
UN's, and better than anything else on offer, as to both benefits and costs. After
all, the US does not even particularly care when those under its security
hegemony (which extends far beyond its allies or clients to provide, perversely,
significant stability benefits even to America's acknowledged enemies) heap
abuse on it (justified or not) because, in the grand scheme of things, it
understands (however inchoately and inconstantly) that the system incorporates
(often heartfelt but, in the final policy result, insincere) public rejection and
protest by the system's beneficiaries. The US is not imperial in a way that would
cause it much to care. Part of accepting US security hegemony by its
beneficiaries includes their rational desire to displace security costs onto another
party, even if that providing party thereby has equally rational reasons to look to
its own interests first, since it so overwhelmingly pays the costs.
Acceptance also includes realistic appraisal of the alternatives. Would
Europe (let alone Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the Philippines,
New Zealand, or Australia, or even Russia) prefer, for example, Chinese
hegemony to the US? The 2008 crisis in Georgia forced a little bit of
discussion-less than the newspaper headlines that summer suggested,
however--on the mission and role of NATO. On the one hand, Europe is in
strategic disarray with the reassertion of regional Russian imperial will: the
31 This discussion expands on a suggestion I made in an earlier article. Kenneth Anderson, US
Countertenism Poliy and Superpower Complance with International Human RIghts Norms, 30 Fordharn
Ind Lj 455, 464-65 (2007).
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interests of those close to it are different from those far away. On the other
hand, at some point even the US will wonder, as a matter of budget and defense
plans, what NATO is worth; how long does a hegemon support its free riders?
Let us pause for a moment to consider NATO more closely: what are its
lessons? The shade of the great Atlanticist Raymond Aron, in realist heaven,
surely wonders at the wisdom of a Western Europe that has voluntarily made
itself dependent upon Russian natural gas during each and every winter, and
which has divided NATO into the half at Russia's periphery that fears territorial
pressures and the half well back from the border that fears loss of energy
supplies. 32 That is looking East. Looking West? Prudent, Aronian-thinkers in
Europe will be skeptical of liberal internationalist Americans bearing gifts of
multilateralism.
Be wary, 0 Europe, and consider carefully what Aron would say of an
America that does not assert, rudely and brusquely and vulgarly, its own interests
and views first, through NATO and other forums. An America that sings sweet
songs of multilateral interdependence is, surely, a superpower that has decided to
simply go along with what everyone else does, which is another way of saying it
has tired of supporting the free riders, which is another way of saying that it, too,
says one thing but might do another. And what it might do is not show up when
the big battalions are finally needed, because it has realized how little the
European contribution means when it comes to actual fighting.
Not so very long ago-yet it seems like forever-foreign policy thinkers
were re-imagining NATO as a force to protect order and justice even beyond
Europe and NATO's formal borders.33 After 9/11, the US responded to an
attack on its territory that came out of Afghanistan; its NATO allies, with much
trepidation, went along, but with no great belief that this was really what NATO
was about. They went along to support an ally in a general sense, not because
they believed this mission was actually core to the NATO mutual security pact.
It was from their standpoint an act of general solidarity and security altruism and
so, naturally, when it came to actual fighting, Germany and others simply
decided to avoid putting their troops very much in harm's way. Perhaps they are
32 For a good short introduction to Raymond Aron's Adanticist and realist thought, see Christopher
Caldwell, RaymondAron and the End of Europe, Bradley Lecture Series (Apr 4, 2005), available online
at <http://www.aei.org/publications/publD.22275,filter.all/pub-detail.asp> (visited Apr 22,
2009).
33 See, for example, , William T. Johnsen, Nato Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the
Whirlwind? 4-5 (Strategic Studies Institute, US Department of Defense, unpublished monograph),
May 25, 1995, available online at <http://books.google.com/books?id=-iMXbOL13A
C&dq=use+NATO+outside+europe+ 1 990s&printsec= frontcover&source=in&hl=en&ei=xqzl
SZCtK4nmlQft-t.XPDA&sa=X&oi=bookresult&ct=result&resnum= 11#PPP1,M1> (visited
Apr 27, 2009). See also Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars 232-234
(PublicAffairs 2008).
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right to see NATO as not being about expeditions to Afghanistan; in any case,
the tepid response puts paid to the idea that NATO will find a mission in armed
humanitarianism outside of Europe in any serious way. But in that case, it would
be prudence and not cynicism-especially if you are Eastern European NATO
members on the periphery closest to Russia-to conclude that core NATO
members think, as they have always thought, that NATO exists to defend the
German border, and not much else. But America, unlike Germany, France,
Britain, or any other country in NATO, or NATO itself, is a global power with
global interests and global enemies. Its adversaries are not just transnational
terrorists-it is sometimes hard for America's core European allies to keep in
mind that the US has security responsibilities and interests at least as great in the
Pacific as in the Atlantic. What happens if America gradually realizes that its
enemies are not ones that play to NATO's Cold War strengths, and finally
awakens from a couple of years of current deficit spending to realize that
America is now suddenly much poorer? Looking to America's own security does
not necessarily mean looking to a chimerical collective NATO security that
protects it from "threats" that are no threat to it.
Let me be clear: these are dangerous ideas, but they are ones always half-
formed within a semi-isolationist America and permanently part of the landscape
because there is a kernel of truth in them-a very risky kernel. For its part,
permanently post-conflict Europe, secure in Kant and Habermas, likewise has its
dangerous ideas-perhaps most of all the belief that Europe is forever beyond
all care of big battalions. Between the two of them, Europe and America,
however, one trusts European common sense to say, "NATO is Europe's
security against Russia if not Iran," and the Americans' good sense to remain too
cautious ever to really consider throwing away the best collective security
arrangement ever created.34
Still, prudent Europeans will fear and not trust an America that does not
put its own interests first and carry the rest along in train. Europe likely will soon
enough face an Iranian nuclear weapon along with its massive dependence upon
Russian natural gas, even as its military strength declines yearly. In important
respects it is today (at least, arguably) more dependent on the American security
guarantee, not less, than at any time since 1990.
But none of this stakes out a claim that Europe looks for its own security
to the UN, UN collective security, or the Security Council. It is entirely about
34 This whole discussion of NATO leaves aside, however, what might rum out to be the most
important shift in the nature of the alliance over time-demographic shifts within core NATO
countries that make solidarity with the US, as a matter of shared cultural, political, and social
values, an artifact of the past.
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NATO to the extent it is about anything. UN collective security is what is
offered to other people.
IV. INTERESTS, AND UN-INTERESTS, OF THE GREAT POWERS
There are people in the world who must rely on the UN collective security
apparatus. It is not necessarily their choice and it is often not to their benefit.
The Great Powers have interests, but they also have un-interests.
Although the American security guarantee is wide-hegemonic, for some
period of years-even it does not extend everywhere. Not even America's
flexible combination of interests and ideals extends everywhere. It provides
immensely important global public goods-securing (leaving aside the piracy of
the Somali coast) the freedom of the high seas, quite apart from the usual
example of NATO and the peace of Europe. The American security guarantee
continues to be the most important stabilizing element in the peace of Asia and
the Pacific rim-that which spares, at least while American power is sufficiently
strong, overt nuclear arms races in East Asia among Japan and its neighbors, for
example. It is sometimes hard for Europe to recall, thinking of China as merely a
far-away economic player, that the US has as much responsibility for the peace
and security of the Pacific as it does for that of the Atlantic. For that matter, the
American security guarantee provides important public goods even for its
enemies-Iran and North Korea benefit from the security of the seas, for
example, and many an anti-American dictator has benefited from the fact that
the American security guarantee sometimes reduces the pressure on neighbors
to arm and confront.
Yet the US security guarantee does not run everywhere. Darfur is one
place, and there are other places in Africa, especially.3" One can of course
construct a strategic rationale for why the US security umbrella ought to extend
to any particular place. In Darfur one can talk about oil, and in other places one
can always construct a strategic rationale for American interest based on flows of
refugees, destabilization of neighboring regimes, and so on. But however
clever-or even accurate-the intellectual constructions of American interests,
not even American power at its zenith could project so far, let alone in an
emerging multipolar world of increasingly competitive Great Powers. To be
sure, the American security guarantee is not an on-off switch. Even without
creating a NATO or having any willingness to put military assets in harm's way,
American power often can be projected to support one or another cause,
35 See Tod Lindberg, The On# Way to Prevent Genocide, Commentary 9 (Apr 2009) ("Creative
diplomacy can make a difference. But in the end, it may all come down to the willingness of the
United States to act.")
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regime, or policy so as to increase regional or local security, through bilateral aid,
economic policies, trade incentives, and other such means.
But limits remain, and they are partly limits of American power, and partly
limits on American interests and just how far those interests can sustain the
projection of American power. Partly, however, the limits arise from what can
actually be done in the demimonde of failed and failing states, the world of
disorder and endemic low-level but brutal civil wars. In short, places in which,
even if America were to identify a clear and overriding body of interests, it might
not (and probably could not) bring meaningful order out of the chaos. Certainly
the experience of Afghanistan is not currently persuading that country or anyone
else that expectations can be very high. The lesson learned is simple, from a
strategic security standpoint: stay away. You will not likely ever be able to leave,
you will not likely create real or lasting order while you stay, and you damage
your ability strategically to respond elsewhere. And if you need to act from a
national security imperative-bring down the Taliban, pursue al Qaeda, or
whatever the future might bring-better to act in those zones, where possible,
using not the full weight of the US military, but instead proxy forces and force
projected from unentangling remote, standoff platforms: these places are best
dealt with, if at all, by locals or by unmanned drone aircraft roaming the skies,
Predators armed with Hellfire missiles.
36
As a strategy for the US, the aim is not the creation of order out of
chaos-that would be nice, but the US is not able to do that and, no matter how
good its political will, in many cases its very presence could well make things
worse. And anyway, there are a lot of places in which it is not the case now that
the US even need concern itself with the situation, because however bad the
situation, it does not offer any direct security threat, not even in the vague
concern about failed states becoming terrorist havens. Moreover, some of the
worst places in which the US cannot find a strategic necessity to extend itself in
any substantial way are not failed states in the sense of pure disorder, but instead
wicked but quite tightly run dictatorships and autocracies-Mugabe's
Zimbabwe, for example.
So the world can be divided into a series of clubs with respect to the
parallel provider of security. The gold-plated, first-class club is the one that
operates under the full benefit of the US security guarantee-not just NATO,
but also Japan, Australia, South Korea, and a range of other industrialized,
democratic allies. The next tier-business-class, so to speak-includes many
states that are not so fully guaranteed in the sense that America would go to war
for them, but still have an enormous security benefit in more passive ways, such




Chicago Journal of International Law
as Latin American or Asian states in which the US presence reduces
considerably the pressure to arm against one's neighbors. The third tier-
coach-benefits from a lesser but still important range of passive public goods,
such as the freedom and security of the seas.
There are no very strict lines here, just a family resemblance within classes.
But the fundamental point is that all three of these clubs benefit from the US
security guarantee in ways that are independent of whatever role the US plays
within the system of UN collective security. They benefit, rather, from a system
that exists as a function of the postwar US role that began with NATO and
extends outward, but has never been nor sought to be integrated into the system
of UN collective security. Certainly one can appeal to Article 52 of the Charter
(which refers to regional alliances), for the face-saving claim that NATO is
somehow "part of' UN collective security, but suffice it to say that Russia does
not see it that way, and other actors in the world are likely to feel as Russia does
in a competitive multipolar world. Indeed, from the beginning, whatever various
American politicians such as Truman said about UN collective security, US
internationalism in security matters was multilateral and internationalist (for
example, NATO)-but only secondarily invested in the UN as a security system.
The US security guarantee is parallel to UN collective security, and although in
some situations the US acts as a dominant actor within UN collective security
mechanisms, its security guarantee-the one the first and second tiers rely upon
for their safety-is outside the UN system altogether. And that is why those
first- and second-tier countries trust it.
The effect of this, however, is that neither the first tier nor the second has
any significant incentive to invest in UN collective security for its own security.
And they don't. They prefer to trust that their bottom-line security interest is
close enough to the US's that they can free-ride on it and that the US will not
very much care so long as it is able to assert its interests first and foremost,
rather than endlessly negotiate them in the way a genuinely mutual-assistance
club would. This is to say, however impolitic, that NATO is only partly a
mutual-assistance club, because it has not truly solved the collective action
problems of mutual assistance. Although formally structured as a forward
contract in which each side must deliver upon the occurrence of certain events,
NATO is actually first and foremost a uni-directional guarantee, a US security
guarantee, trusted by NATO nations because they trust their interests to be
sufficiently close to those of the US that they can rely upon it, at least in matters
of security. This is also to say that the most successful collective security
arrangement ever owes its success in large part not to collective security but to
the hegemonic guarantee of its principal member. Moreover, the first and
second tiers have reasons not to take actions that might empower a UN
collective security that undermined the proven value of the US guarantee in
favor of a UN collective security system with no answers to the collective
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action-failure problems, let alone the dangerous insincerity of sovereigns with
actually deeply opposed interests.
The third tier is far less invested in the US guarantee, despite many passive
benefits, but that does not lead it to greater trust in UN collective security
mechanisms-particularly given that those mechanisms, invested in the Security
Council, would frequently involve (even if invoked and operative) reliance upon
Security Council members who in fact looked elsewhere for their own security.
Countries in particular circumstances sometimes do look to UN collective
security-not as part of the world of failed states and truly endemic disorder,
but as reasonably intact states dealing with the end of civil war or other
situations, such as Central America following the 1980's civil wars-and UN
collective security, through peacekeeping operations, has had some very
important successes in such places as Guatemala and El Salvador.
These successes are one of the most important arguments for UN
collective security as an activity for the US to support. But it is equally important
to understand what their success typically requires: a reasonably intact state
structure; a defined civil war with a defined opposition that is being brought to a
defined end; no Great Power opposition on account of its strategic interests; and
the interest of the US and other Great Powers, formally through the Security
Council but also informally as a matter of politics and resources, to support the
transition. In places like Guatemala or El Salvador, the US acts along both the
parallel security system tracks, as it were-partly exercising US hegemonic
security capabilities and relationships that have long existed quite apart from the
UN, but partly acting as a dominant power through the UN and Security
Council. There are, of course, no strict lines; the division is partly arbitrary and
one role bleeds into the other. But if activities with respect to this third tier of
states and security situations run them together, the core functions, legitimating
devices, and justifications are separate and identifiable, by reference back to how
the first and second security tiers of states view their own security.
Yet there is a fourth tier. It consists of the people, regimes, and places that
fundamentally lie outside the US parallel security guarantee. To the extent that
the US extends something to them, it is as a powerful, sometimes dominant,
actor within the UN collective security system. To the extent that anyone else
extends security to these places and zones, it is likewise through the UN
collective security system, at least in a loose sense of typically seeking UN
approval, acting with UN mandates, and so on. Ironically, the legal letter of UN
collective security receives its greatest expression in precisely the places in which
the world's leading members have the least at stake, and in ways that would not
really occur to them if it mattered to their own security. These people, trapped in
many of the world's worst civil wars, wars of disorder, and failed states or,
alternatively, the worst dictatorships, have no choice but to accept UN collective
security if even offered. They are would-be "consumers" of security, in
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Kennedy's terms, at the mercy of possible "providers" of security who, however,
act at their option. At least in those unfortunate circumstances, the general
failure to come up with a convincing solution to collective action problems in
UN collective security is overwhelmingly evident.
The collective security problem is more complicated than that, however.
On the one hand, a collective action game can consist of parties who each bring
to the table resources of value to all, a game of mutual benefit; there are
problems of defection and free riding even in these cases. On the other hand,
the situation of this fourth tier is that they do not bring any resources to the
table, so that any collective action is not collective in the sense of mutual benefit,
but merely altruism. In that case, the fundamental problem is not defection and
free riding in an arrangement of otherwise mutual benefit, but instead the
fundamental question is why act at all if, for the security providers, there is no
mutual benefit?
Various answers have been proposed to try and get beyond simply the true,
but not necessarily very motivating, answer of global altruism. They fall into one
of two approaches-try to find a way to reframe the argument to turn altruism
into mutual benefit or, alternatively, simply accept that it is altruism. The most
noteworthy "refraining" has come from the UN itself-the Secretary General's
High Level Panel, addressing the issues of UN reform prior to the 2005 General
Assembly reform summit, sought to recast the global security issue as one of
mutual benefit rather than altruism. It proposed-in much the same way as
those seeking to convince the US to address this or that global situation by
constructing an argument from interests would argue-that the global north and
global south were bound by the exchange of benefits, security for the global
north and security and economic development for the global south, in a sort of
grand bargain between the two. It was not very convincing-the global north
particularly simply saw it for what it was, an argument for optional altruism or,
worse, a veiled threat that the global south had to be paid off with development
benefits, and paid it no serious attention.
What this suggests, however, is that the UN collective security system is,
first, typically not a system of mutual benefit, but in its most important features
is a system of altruism, at least as the system's security providers see it-always
optional, however much they say otherwise in the time-honored fashion of
insincere promising at the UN. Second, contrary to Kennedy's suggestion that
UN collective security be seen as an understanding that the system rests on big,
powerful "providers" of security and small, weak "consumers" of security
banding together in an implicit contract, the one-sided nature of the "bargain"
means that it is not an "exchange." It is instead better understood (to follow
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Kennedy's business metaphors) as merely an option exercisable when and if the
providers of security want. It lacks mutuality.37
But in that case, why the persistence of this parallel system at all? One
important reason these dual security systems persist is that the US (and the
world that takes its stability from US hegemony) sees the UN system as the least
costly system for enforcing minimum order in the hopeless world of failed and
failing states-places that they will not, and realistically cannot (pace
Afghanistan) hope to police. In that case, however, there is a point where
interest and idealism intersect in how the US should engage with that UN
collective security system. The US should want the system to succeed in places
where the US will not go-partly for its broadest interests, but mostly on
account of its ideals. This has three concrete consequences for US policy.
First, the US should invest heaviy in-and pay its current budgetay share of-UN
peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations ("PKO") are one of the bright
spots of the UN-an activity at which the UN has been doing successively
better over the past fifteen years, particularly when combined with regional
multilateral governance bodies in Africa and Latin America. The massive
corruption that has been uncovered in UN peacekeeping operations,3" sexual
crimes by peacekeeping troops,39 places in the 1990s where peacekeeping was a
humanitarian or even genocidal disaster-Rwanda4 ° or Srebrenica 4 -- or by
places, including Darfur, where peacekeeping has not been successful4 2-all
these weigh heavily, but they should not be permitted to overshadow the modest
but accumulating successes of UN peacekeeping. American conservatives, in
37 This general topic of mutuality and international law as a form of contract is well discussed in
Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Tbeory and the Enforcement of
International Law (Cambridge 2006).
38 Claudia Rosett and George Russel, Procurement Scandak New Conflict of Interest in Annan's Inner Circle?,
FOXNews.com (Oct 4, 2005), available online at
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,171216,00.html> (visited Apr 22, 2009).
39 Susan Notar, Peacekeepers as Peretrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 14 Am U J Gender Soc Poly & L 413 (2006); United Nations, A
Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, Report ofthe Secretary-General, UN Doc A/59/710 (2005).
40 See generally Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights
Watch 1999). As a former coworker of Alison Des Forges at Human Rights Watch in the 1990s, I
want to note that her tragic death in a plane crash in New York a few months ago, at this writing,
is an enormous loss to everyone interested in the promotion of justice.
41 See generally Adam LeBor, Coplici with Evil: The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide (Yale
2006).
42 UN News Center, UN Report: Worsening Situation in West Da fur JeopardZes Aid Efforts (Feb 20,
2008), available online at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25689&Cr
=darfur&Crl =unamid> (visited Apr 22, 2009).
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particular, need to understand the successes and value that UN PKO provide to
the US and its foreign policy.
Successes include (as earlier noted) El Salvador and Guatemala, but also
Mozambique, Cyprus, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and even more."
Sometimes the benefits are contested, and in many cases serious judgment of
success or failure will not come for years, but still short-term successes must
usually be seen as successes considering the alternatives. It is far easier to bring
to mind the disasters such as Rwanda than the successes. Likewise, also as noted,
not all the successes take place in places that are a straight-up disaster from a
governance standpoint-many, perhaps most, of the successes have taken place
in countries in which there is a structure of government, sometimes reasonably
effective, but the situation is one of transitioning from civil war.
The improving record of PKO reflects improved doctrine at UN
headquarters; improved professionalism and training of troops contributed by
different countries; improved equipment and increased numbers; and above all,
increased funding.44 UN PKO are funded on a budget that is outside of the
regular assessed UN budget. It is voluntary in the sense that there is no formal
Charter obligation to contribute to it. However, in order to avoid the problem of
everyone agreeing that someone else should pay for activities that all agree are a
good idea-as well as, crucially, to allow for advancing planning and
development of missions that will run for several years-PKO have a voluntary,
but still assessed and agreed upon, budget and schedule of individual country
contributions.
The importance of being able to plan on a budget several years in advance
for ongoing and anticipated missions, quite apart from the unexpected
development, is one of the best things that has taken place in producing positive
real world effects from UN management reforms. It is not just for the usually
cited reasons why the US should make its contributions to the UN generally
(which might or might not be valid depending upon circumstances), reasons
such as reputation, being a player, etc. Rather, the argument for the US making
committed, timely, and generous contributions to PKO is very strong on its own
particular merits. PKO are not cheap, but the current successes reflect the
willingness to invest in a successful activity, and it is under the control of the
Security Council rather than the General Assembly. Its budget of some $5.28
43 These are not always direct UN missions, run out of UN headquarters, but are instead sometimes
UN missions run through, or jointly with, regional authorities such as the Organization of
American States.
44 See generally Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell, American Interests and UN Reform: Report of the
Task Force on the United Nations Foreword (US Institution of Peace 2005).
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billion dollars far outstrips the UN regular budget of approximately $3.8 billion
for 2006-2007.45
Second, as an indispensable adjunct to PKO, the US should support and invest in
peacebuilding operations through the UN. Peacebuilding follows logically, inexorably
in fact, on the successes and investment in PKO. One of the very few, but also
one of the most important, positive outcomes of the 2005 UN reform process,
found in the final outcome document adopted by the General Assembly, was the
creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, established by concurrent resolutions
of the General Assembly and Security Council.46 It is a UN intergovernmental
advisory body, whose mission is to bring together crucial actors in the
international community to support countries undergoing transition from armed
conflict to peace in finding strategies to preserve peace and rebuilding economic,
social, civil society, governmental, and other functions of post-conflict
reconstruction that go beyond simply the provision of troops to monitor a
ceasefire. It is a role eminently suited to the nature of the UN's legitimacy to act
not merely as a "humanitarian neutral," but to engage in nation-building in a way
that requires the willingness to assert basic human rights, legal, political, and
other values.
The US is very rarely able to assert that kind of legitimacy, alone and solely
on its own say-so, in the failed state and post-conflict zones. It was not able to
do so in either Afghanistan or Iraq solely on its own, and it is even less able to
do so in still more difficult places such as Congo. What both the US and the UN
have learned out of the adventures in nation-building in the past eight years is
that security matters-it matters for its own sake, and it matters because in the
absence of a minimum tranquillitis ordinis, nothing else good can happen either:
justice and peace both matter, but underlying each is first achieving a certain
level of order out of the Hobbesian chaos. The UN learned this to its sorrow in
the terrorist attack that destroyed its headquarters in Baghdad in 2004, and took
the life of one of its great peace-builders and many more besides.47 The US has
learned it the hard way through the "surge" in Iraq.
45 United Nations, Current Peacekeeping Operations, UN Background Note DPI/1634/Rev.94 (2009),
available online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnoteOlOlOl.pdf> (visited Apr 22,
2009); The United Nations Today 18, 78 (Department of Public Information 2008); United Nations,
Concluding Main Part of Session, General Assembly Adopts $4.17 Billion Budget Early Saturday, in Wake of
Fifth Committee's Diplomatic Breakthrough, UN Press Release GA/10684 (2007).
46 Security Counsel Res No 1645, UN Doc S/RES/1645 (2005); General Assembly Res No 60/1,
UN Doc A/Res/60/1 (2005); General Assembly Draft Res 60/L.40, UN Doc A/60/L.40 (2005).
47 Consider Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World
496-516 (Penguin 2008) (discussing the UN evaluation of the security situation at the Canal
Hotel); United Nations, Secretarg-General Releases Findings of Iraq Accountabiliy Panel Report, Decides on
Discpl'nagy Measures, UN Press Release SG/SM/9230/IK/425 (2004);. United Nations, Report of
the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq (Oct 20, 2003), available online at
Summer 2009
Anderson
Chicago Journal of International Law
UN legitimacy in these post-conflict, peacebuilding, nation-building affairs
and places is far from complete. For one, assertion of legitimacy as a nation-
building actor in Geneva or New York is not the same as legitimacy on the
ground with an unconvinced local population. For another, the legitimacy of
"pure" humanitarian neutrality in a humanitarian emergency in armed conflict,
and the neutral provision of humanitarian assistance, are altogether different
from the legitimacy of post-conflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding involves
nation-building, and reconstruction of social, political, and state institutions.
That work often requires not strict neutrality, but the commitment to political
values that might indeed be contested, even violently, in a way that purely
humanitarian emergency aid might not.4" Either way, however, the UN is able to
carry out these activities in many situations and places in a way that neither the
US nor any individual state alone could hope to do. In making commitments to
such situations, the UN agencies tasked with such work must necessarily
maintain an independent weight and role to support that UN legitimacy, even at
the cost of a certain amount of friction with the US and its political goals as the
dominant security player within this system.
Third, beyond political, diplomatic, and finandal support, the US-deliberately acting
in its role of dominant militagy player within the system of UN collective securi6y-should find
ways to assist the practical and logistical requirements of PKO (andpost-conflictpeacebuilding
as well). The issue is often not just money. It is often in-kind capability, such as
transportation, logistical "lift" capability, technologically advanced intelligence
for PKO, and other assets that are available only through the US. Obviously this
is within the strictures of a US military with a mission-seeing to US security
and the US security guarantee-that is fundamentally different from UN
collective security. It is also a US military facing the burdens, at this moment, of
two wars and other major security obligations. As a general policy, however, the
US needs to give serious consideration to ways in which it can provide in-kind
assistance as appropriate and feasible: "lift" for the logistics of missions in
difficult to reach places, helicopters and other specialized air transport, as well as
such assistance where appropriate in the form of enforcing no-fly zones (Darfur,
possibly). These principles apply as well to peacebuilding missions. This is not to
<http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf> (visited Apr 22,
2009) ("Ahtisaari Report"). A good friend of mine also died in that explosion, the renowned
specialist in refugee and migration affairs, Arthur Helton, waiting in an antechamber for a meeting
with UN officials. The fact that so many good people died in that attack has certainly caused me
to focus on the important conceptual questions that the UN mission elided-particularly the
difference between "neutral" humanitarian aid and the inevitably politically fraught questions of
nation-building and peacebuilding.
48 See generally Kenneth Anderson, Humanitarian Inviolabilioy in Crisis: The Meaning of Imparia#y and
Neutrah4 for UN and NGO Agencies Following the 2003-2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts, 17 Harv
Hum Rts J 41 (2004).
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take a position on any particular burden, but instead to support the abiding
principle that the US, as the dominant military power within UN collective
security, is in a position (at least sometimes, taking into account its own
obligations) to contribute in-kind assistance of a type that only the US is able to
provide.
V. THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS TALKING SHOP OF THE
NATIONS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
UN collective security thus faces a daunting series of obstacles in order for
it ever to become the dominant security system. UN collective security is, in
many situations, not just altruism rather than mutual aid, but collective altruism.
And it is not merely collective altruism in a passive sense of "pass the hat," but
in the sense of providing active, in-kind resources such as troops. Collective
altruism is far more difficult to motivate than that of a single or small group.
Next, in situations where UN collective security can constitute genuinely a
mutual assistance pact, it has no good answer (no worse, to be sure, than anyone
has come up with, either) for addressing collective action failures, particularly
defection and free-riding. Finally, a super-strong player has established its own
parallel security system, which it extends directly to its "posse" (NATO and
important friends), but which also provides a much broader range of security
public goods to many others as well, with the effect of reducing any real need to
test UN collective security mechanisms. The provision of public goods extends
in some things even to straight-out enemies of the US.
Countries seem to have counted the costs of seeking to replace the parallel
system with true collective security, and have not been willing to pursue it. The
parallel system is a major reason why the UN persists in static equipoise with
respect to international peace and security. The capacities that the UN is
developing through PKO and, one hopes, the Peacebuilding Commission are
essentially collective altruism, and in that sense they do not upset the security
equilibrium; indeed, they further it insofar as they create a useful specialization
and division of labor in the provision of security to the world in different parts
and ways. In many ways, it is a beneficial equilibrium, for however long it is able
to last.
The existence of this dual and parallel security system should not leave
aside, however, the other security issue of the Security Council. The discussion
has proceeded as if the fundamental problem were one of coordination and
execution by a collectivity of its agreed-upon security goals. In that case, the
problems are altruism, collective action failures, free-riding, efficiency and
effectiveness. But, of course, with regularity and-perhaps especially in a
multipolar world-increasingly, the issue is not collective action failure, but
fundamental clashes of interest among the Great Powers on the nature of action,
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collective or any other. It is something of a comfort to treat the fundamental
problem of the Security Council as being a failure of collective will to do
something about which, in a cost-free, unlimited-resources world, everyone
would agree to what ought to be done. If that were the case, then the only real
constraint would be resources and will, not opposed interests and ideals.
Because we live in a world that has not only collective action problems but also
deeply opposed interests and ideals, however-not infrequently on display at the
Security Council-this is also something of a fantasy, and likely to grow more so
in the competitive multipolar world of tomorrow.
What does multipolarity mean for the UN and for the US-UN
relationship? Clearly, after all, the rise of new powers must have implications for
the parallel security systems earlier described. Multipolarity might provide a
dynamic that, at least within the arena of international security, but in much else
besides, shifts the terms of UN stasis and equipoise, for example. These shifts
might take place in ways congenial to the US-but they might not. And they
might take place in ways congenial to the UN institutionally, or to a large
number of UN member states-but they might not.
The rise of new powers refers to at least three separate phenomena
(limiting the list only to state actors that would directly be present at the UN,
and excluding, for example, non-state terrorist organizations):
* The rise of the "resource extraction" autocrades. They are driven primarily by oil,
but not necessarily limited to it. The obvious candidates are the Middle
Eastern oil producers, but also, of course, Russia, Venezuela, and a few
others. Although the recent fall in oil prices illustrates the general
problem of a resource extractor seeking to act as a Great Power on
global commodities prices alone, the boom and bust nature of these
autocracies in fact makes them more unstable and volatile as power
players. Autocratic at home and yet often highly popular with national
masses, dismissive of liberal democracy while in some cases adhering to
democracy's bare forms, rationality qualified by the tendency of leaders
to Hobbesian "glory," anti-American even while bound to it and the rest
of the parliamentary democracies by the commodities markets,
aggressive abroad and with a strong sense of national grievances to be
carried abroad-they are destabilizing to the existing status quo and fully
mean to be.
" The rise of China and India as new producion powers. They are production
powers (whether in industrial production or services) rather than
resource powers. They are, however, not just resource-consuming or
resource-intensive in their economic growth but, as manufacturers
(China especially), affirmatively resource hungry and energy intensive.
They seek to sustain rates of growth to maintain internal stability-but
also to assert themselves in the world.
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* Poor, unstable, failing or "rogue" states, with a nuclear weapon. Specifically,
Pakistan (a "failing state") and North Korea (a "rogue state" in the sense
that, although not unstable, it exists outside of and at odds with a large
part of the international community); in some ways, too, Iran (poor, with
internal instabilities, and potentially destabilizing conflicts with regional
neighbors such as Saudi Arabia). The nuclear weapon is not produced as
a consequence of a rising economy (as in the case of India) but instead as
a siphoning of resources from it. The most destabilizing scenario is a
nuclear-armed failed or failing state. The common element among these
other heterogeneous states is a nuclear weapon (or the growing
possibility of one), portending highly unstable and unpredictable
consequences; the nuclear weapon is not the consequence of strength,
but an attempt to compensate for weakness.
If we are indeed moving toward a more multipolar world-not
everywhere, but at least in certain strategically important regions, such as the
Russian "near abroad" or the Chinese periphery-then the Great Power
conflicts promise to become more acute, not less. As David Rieff has pointed
out, multipolarity is by definition competitive, not cooperative.49 Moreover, the
issues over which the rising powers jostle sometimes are intensely ideological-
what seem to the West sometimes inchoate national grievances and resentments
carried abroad, to that new power are concrete and unmistakable, as in the case
of Russia's fraternal support for Serbia regarding Kosovo, or its view of
Georgia, NATO, and the "near-abroad." Sometimes it is nationalism deliberately
stoked at home coupled with a long-term sense of being deprived of a rightful
place in the world, as a partial description of China's rise to power. But in many
other cases, the jostling is very much the competition over what, to the rich and
self-satisfied West, look like frankly grubby commercial interests. China's
willingness to protect Sudan during long periods at the Security Council, for
example, is really about China's oil interests-and the first time when, seemingly,
one of the "permanent five" showed itself willing to rent out its veto, or threat
thereof, for purely commercial gain. But that is the nature of a more competitive
world in which new rising powers are rising because they are commercial
powers; the long-term hunger for production resources is very real.
In a competitive, multipolar world, too, cosmopolitanism of the kind that
idealists are wont to imagine is more, rather than less, difficult to attain or
sustain. There is a tendency, sometimes, to dream of a world in which
multipolarity reduces the power of the US to something closer to its fellows, so
49 David Rieff, Concerts and Sill Seasons, Open Democracy (Feb 23, 2007), available online at
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-ameicanpower/concerts-
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that we could all exercise the cosmopolitan dream that the sovereign power of
the US prevents from taking root. But the new multipolar world is more
intensely nationalistic, both inside regimes and in the international community,
than the one consisting of parallel security systems in which the US is, let us be
frank, a rather un-demanding imperial hegemon°-so much so that "imperial"
is not very apt. The grand irony is that the most propitious time for dreaming of
global governance was precisely when the US was at its maximum, largely
unopposed strength, because it allowed much of the democratic industrialized
world the luxury of imagining that its security was one thing, when in fact it was
another. In a competitive, jostling multipolar world, efforts to drive utopian
ideals of global governance are not just a quaint, holdover indulgence from the
less stressful times of straight-up US hegemony, but an affirmative danger,
because they tempt institutions beyond their limits in time of crisis.5
The multipolar world that seems to be rising argues for a Security Council
that functions, in important situations, neither as an agglomeration of Great
Powers, the "concert" of Great Powers,5" nor as the "management committee of
our fledgling collective security system,"53 in which institutions of governance
superior to even the sovereign Great Powers have evolved. In situations in
which the interests of the Great Powers, on or off the Security Council, are not
in play, either of those modes might be genuinely useful as a form of political
rhetoric, when engaged in some form of altruistic collective, for example, in a
PKO or peacebuilding mission. But a world in which new commercial powers
are busily rooting about for resources is a world that is likely to increase the
competitive material interests of the new powers, not reduce them, and likely to
convert situations that fifteen years ago might have been thought a matter of
altruism via the Security Council because, frankly, no one important had very
much at stake, into situations where something-money-is at stake. The
increasing commercial presence of China in Africa, in places where the rich
Western powers cannot see a profit (in large part because of Western concerns
about the environment, human rights, exploitation of labor and resources, and
50 See Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the
Twenoy-first Century xvi (PublicAffairs 2005) ("Although America looks like Goliath, however, in
important ways the world's strongest power does not act like him. If America is a Goliath, it is a
benign one.").
51 Consider, for example, the League of Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
52 See generally Michael Lind, US Foreign Poliy after Bush, Open Democracy (Feb 12, 2007), available
online at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/what-next-4340.jsp>
(visited Apr 22, 2009); Michael Lind, The American Way of Strategy: US Foreign Poliy and the American
Way of Life (Oxford 2006) (discussing the use and necessity of concerts of power in collective
security arrangements to deal most effectively with emerging powers such as China and Russia).
53 United Nations, To Function More Effeeively (cited in note 8).
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such matters), has altered the material equation as to where the powers have
merely "un-interests."
In the multipolar world, the function of the Security Council thus becomes
that of the "talking shop of the nations." Only rhetorically and on special
occasions is the Security Council the "management committee of collective
security," and only sometimes the "concert of nations." In times of genuine
conflict and crisis among the Great Powers themselves, of course, a "talking
shop" is always what the Security Council becomes, precisely as it was intended
to do. As President Dwight Eisenhower said of the UN generally, but as is
particularly apt for the Security Council, "[it] still represents man's best-
organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield."54 But in a
competitive multipolar world, it is not merely in crisis that it becomes a talking-
shop, in which the UN and Security Council are invested with no greater
aspiration than to serve as the place where Great Powers go to talk rather than
fight. The Security Council becomes a talking shop among jostling powers, not a
concert and not a management committee of security, much, much more of the
time. A place for diplomacy-and that is all.5
It will perhaps be responded that this description is a straw man. After all,
who ever claimed that the Security Council was not most of the time a talking
shop for diplomacy, throughout its history, including all the years since the end
of the Cold War? What else is it except a place for diplomacy? But this is to play
the ing6nue. There is diplomacy because by definition that is what diplomats do;
there is diplomacy where negotiation, however sharp and tit for tat, is essentially
around a positive-sum enterprise, such as global trade. But there is also
diplomacy where your gain is my loss, and vice-versa. It is not merely the tallying
up of tactical gains and losses in pursuit of some larger strategic, mutual good,
but instead your gain is my loss, and vice-versa, period, and full stop. The scope
of that final, zero-sum category of diplomacy is what drives a Security Council
coming to discover, under multipolarity, a significantly reduced space for what
we might call "competitive cooperation"-tactically competitive, strategically
cooperative. It is discovering instead a significantly increased space for genuine
and pure strategic competition.
54 Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations: A Stogy of Superpowers,
Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and TheirQuestfor a Peaceful World 287 (Westview 2003).
55 See Peter Barker, Quieter Approach to Spreading Democracy Abroad, NY Times WK1 (Feb 21, 2009)
(mentioning how Secretary of State Clinton seems well aware of the reality of the Security Council
as a talking shop, making it part of the explanation for the emphasis in her department on the
"three Ds-defense, diplomacy, and development" rather than democracy or human rights.).
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VI. THE NEW GREAT POWERS AND SECURITY COUNCIL
REFORM
But this multipolar world of rising new powers raises a very particular legal
and diplomatic issue. If the Security Council is (once again) going to be
especially the talking shop of the competitive Great Powers, then shouldn't it be
the talking shop of the actual Great Powers? And so the much debated, much
vexed controversy of Security Council reform.
On nearly every measure-population, influence, even on some metrics of
military might-the Security Council's five permanent members are
unrepresentative of the world.56 Whatever the justifications that existed in 1945,
a Security Council today without India, for example, or any large, powerful
country in Africa or Latin America as permanent members, is more than passing
strange, not to mention infuriating and delegitimating. After all, if a 1945
justification for the creation of the Council was specifically in order to keep the
Great Powers within the tent, as it were-well, it is not even especially a
collection of the Great Powers anymore, let alone the collection of all the Great
Powers. The arguments for reform of the Council's membership are powerful
on the rationales by which the Security Council was created. Arguments against
reform are mostly pure realpolitik-permanent, veto-wielding members simply
will not agree to subtract existing members, or even to add new ones, at least
with the veto. Other arguments against membership reform are offered as realist
arguments: the US position during most of the 2005 UN reform debates, for
example, was that however unrepresentative the Council, the only mechanism of
change would be expansion, which would quickly turn the Security Council into
an ineffective mass, incapable of making any important decisions.57
These realist arguments against expansion are as powerful as they ever
were; likewise the arguments in favor of reform. Still, it should also be said
against reform that if the still-valid theory of the Council was to keep the Great
Powers inside the tent, rather than making (more) mischief without, then it is
not so easy to establish who is a Great Power. Able to project military power
and contribute military assets, and not merely money, to collective security? Not
Germany, despite its wealth, and only questionably Brazil or any other Latin
American power. Stable and legitimate? Nigeria is a big question mark; better to
go with South Africa, unless one's priority was, as it perhaps should be, UN
56 See Kennedy, The Parliament of Man at 51 (cited in note 7) (describing the conundrum of the UN
Security Council).
7 See John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Opion." Dfendin g America at the United Nations and Abroad 250-
51 (Threshold Editions 2007) (explaining that it was America's belief that an expansion of the
Security Council would make it ineffective).
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peacekeeping troop contributions. Nuclear powers? Consider the incentives that
would create. Representation on the basis of region? The UN system makes a
fetish of regional representation and rotation, primarily as a mechanism for
stability. But powerful regional actors are as likely to be seen as threats to others
in a given region as stabilizing, let alone representative. (Although one can
certainly observe that in some, though not all, cases in which the animosities of
past eras have largely gone away, such as Brazil, its very presence on the Security
Council as the "Latin American" country might have the virtuous effect of
"locking" it within informal pressures of "good behavior" of the system.)
More generally, in the system of parallel security, the American security
guarantee has allowed, and indeed fostered, the separation of wealth and military
power, and not just in Europe. Germany's remarkably insistent claim to a
permanent Council seat, solely on the basis of its moral virtue combined with its
economic power and financial contributions to the UN, but no military to speak
of, puts the gap between wealth and military capacity squarely on the table in
establishing criteria for membership. What does it even mean to be a Great
Power today? Is money enough? A competitive, multipolar world will quite
possibly reverse the trend toward the separation of wealth and hard power and
render that debate moot-but it would do so by eroding the value of the US
security guarantee. In the meantime, however, the criteria for determining who is
a Great Power, for purposes of winning a seat on the Security Council, are not
especially clear.
The problem is intractable except on the basis of throwing in the towel on
serious criteria for selection or simply expanding-so fulfilling US fears-to the
point of guaranteeing ineffectiveness. Serious powers understand that the
Security Council is the only truly special club-Kofi Annan, after years of
courting and stroking the international NGOs as a way of getting around the
problem of powerful states, understood as soon as 9/11 had occurred that the
Security Council was his true interlocutor and constituency and master. 58
Although it is not inconceivable that France and Britain's permanent, veto-
holding seats might someday be collapsed into a single EU seat, it remains a vital
national matter of pride to each. Certainly no other member-Russia, China, or
the US as militarily plainly Great Powers who must be kept inside the tent-
could be imagined not being permanent members with vetoes, at least if anyone
has a veto. Reform therefore comes down to proposed forms of expansion, and
with what privileges that the existing club might reject as diluting the franchise.
58 See James Traub, The Best Intentions: KofiAnnan and the UN in the Era of American World Power 171-
87 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2006) (discussing the US approach to lobbying the Security Council
to take or permit action in Iraq).
Summer 2009
Anderson
Chicago Journal of International Law
Permanent? Long term? Veto bearing? How many members before the Council
becomes a mini-General Assembly?
Intractable or not, Security Council reform was by some measures the
dominant discussion of the 2005 UN reform negotiations. This was especially so
in the national debates (cheerleading, really) that took place in claimant countries
in the run-up to the General Assembly summit. Perusal of the national press in
India, Japan, Nigeria, Brazil, Germany and others would do much to dispel any
impression that national sentiment is not what it has been for the last hundred
years. All that national sentiment against one of the UN's fundamental
antinomies: how to have a Security Council that is realistically a meeting ground
of the Great Powers, but also how to make it more representative of the world,
toward the ideal of global governance. And, added to that, how to have a
mechanism of change for something apparently set in stone. Justifiably dismayed
and concerned that UN reform negotiations were turning into a single-minded
focus upon an unresolvable issue, Kofi Annan, to his credit, repeatedly urged the
main players in UN reform to leave this question aside in favor of more urgent
questions that could be resolved, a request that was, however, only partly and
grudgingly honored.59
But the main antagonist in this argument was (and is) not the US. Its place
on the Security Council is beyond question and it is thus in the rare position of
being a relatively neutral, "honest broker" on the issue. The US concern for the
effectiveness, above any other consideration, of the Security Council is real-an
argument the US does seem to realize, however, cuts several different directions
in the reform debate. The heated disputes arose instead from the lesser and
declining military powers, France and Britain, as against the clamors of Japan,
India, Nigeria, Brazil, and even economically powerful but demilitarized
Germany. Yet suppose that the existing permanent five agreed, by some miracle,
to accept an alteration. What then? In real life, Japan is checked by China; India
by Pakistan; Brazil possibly by its jealous Latin American neighbors Argentina or
Mexico; Germany by everyone in global recoil at a third EU permanent member.
And alas, it is far from inconceivable that in the next quarter century, Nigeria
might fall into grave civil war.
VII. CONCLUSION: US POLICY TOWARD THE SECURITY
COUNCIL UNDER MULTIPOLARITY
The UN collective security system is both limited in its scope and relatively
stable in its work because of the presence of the parallel US security guarantee,
which does the heavy lifting of providing the true security guarantee to a wide
59 Id at 360-61.
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range of countries, in different degrees, and global public goods in crucial
security matters. It is a reasonably stable equilibrium arrangement, and one in
which complaints by leading beneficiaries are best seen, not as calls for a
genuinely different system or a desire actually to test their reliance upon the
promise of UN collective security, but instead as a way of pressuring the US to
do what they want, without altering the system's basic architecture. The US
offers a hegemonic yet parallel system. It is hegemonic rather than imperial,
hegemonic without rejecting UN collective security as such, "hegemonically
cooperative" with UN collective security most of the time rather than constantly
competitive with it-but, importantly, it is hegemonic rather than multilateral.
The US security guarantee not multilateral? How so? But it is not multilateral
because it is not mutual. The US does not fundamentally rely upon the security
commitments of those who most benefit from its guarantee, and in that sense it
is not mutual. The US makes relatively few demands upon its beneficiaries-but
for that reason it is willing to put its own security agenda first and, for the same
reason that it puts its own security first, others are willing to trust its long-term
commitment to it.
It is a stable system so long as the US is able and willing to bear the cost,
and provided it is not undermined-or made unmanageably expensive-by the
rise of competitive new powers, especially regional ones, in a competitive world.
If the US became serious about multilateralism in the making of actual,
consequential security decisions with its allies (rather than rote and pious
references to multilateralism in speeches or in tours of foreign capitals), those
allies might want profoundly to ask whether the US has begun to pull away from
its hegemonic security guarantee.
At the same time, the US does participate in UN collective security as the
globally dominant player. The US sees UN collective security as advantageous in
advancing many of its interests and ideals, especially through PKO and
peacebuilding efforts, in which the UN is better positioned to carry out the
activity on the ground and the US is best off not having "ownership" of the
activity on the ground. There are many missions involving security in which the
UN is, compared to the US, doing it directly and is the cheapest, most efficient,
most effective and, let us be clear, most legitimate provider of security. Many of
these missions are ascribable to UN "collective security," but they would best be
described as "collective security altruism," because they are not really about
collective security as much as about mutual aid. The distinction matters because
it negatively affects the incentives of states, including the US, to engage.
But engagement on these issues, including altruistic security, is an abiding
principle for the US-the UN can perform many missions congenial to US
desires and at a lower cost on metrics both material and ideological. But
successful engagement requires clear understanding of the differences between
the US security guarantee, UN collective security as a mutual benefit activity, and
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UN collective security as exercise in altruism. It also requires US money and, in
appropriate circumstances, logistical support in kind.
The abiding principle for the US with respect to the Security Council as an
institution is engagement. If that seems obvious just because the default answer
of US-UN relations is the autopilot of "always engage," that is not the correct
principle for dealing with the UN and its many parts in every circumstance. With
respect to the Security Council, however, you can always veto what you seriously
do not like. If the US does not engage with it, someone else will, and to the US's
detriment. We recall the Korean War, which after all became technically a UN,
rather than US, war only because the Soviet representative had boycotted the
Council rather than remaining in chambers to engage and veto.6" Others'
engagement, while the US is disengaged, might even claim the only power under
the UN Charter to issue binding commands.
Obviously engagement means vastly more than merely showing up to vote.
But full diplomatic engagement in the Security Council also only means
something if the US has a clear idea of what kind of institution the Security
Council is-and that includes what the US imagines it will become, and what it
projects that the Security Council might or should become. Those expectations
about the future affect profoundly how the US, and how other Council
members and other actors, deal with it today. Three modes for the Security
Council are on long-term offer:
* management committee of the UN collective security system;
* concert of the powers and Great Powers; and
" talking shop of the nations.
There is a limited role for the "management committee" of UN collective
security-corresponding to the UN collective security role in "altruistic security"
and, importantly, in which important powers are not in conflict over their
interests-allowing the Council to act as a whole. It is unfortunate that this
category might become more narrow in a more resource competitive, multipolar
world; there are situations in the world, particularly among failed states in Africa,
where a declaration of UN trusteeship for security purposes, or some security
device short of that but undertaken by the UN, could be a helpful step, but such
steps might be precluded in a more resource-competitive world.
The Security Council as a "concert" of powers and Great Powers is a
model that corresponds principally to situations of UN collective security as
mutual assistance, rather than altruism. The concert was most dramatically on
display, of course, in the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War.
An area that today is perhaps amenable to the "concert of nations" through the
60 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man at 55-56 (cited in note 7).
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Security Council is piracy off the coast of Somalia, because the trade of so many
nations is at risk, no matter what their other disputes. But if the world becomes
increasingly multipolar, it is far from clear that much scope exists for such
concerted mutual aid.
Finally, the Security Council remains as talking shop of the powers and
Great Powers; particularly in a multipolar world, this is the fundamental role of
the Council. The debates over Russian intervention in Georgia, Kosovar
independence or, for that matter, the Iraq War are emblematic of the talking
shop role of the Security Council-and in those terms, each of those debates
was a success for the Security Council, not a failure, even according to at least
some of the contradictory criteria of the Charter's framers, because each one
involved the deeply held, opposed interests of Great Powers. Nor should this
"talking shop" vision of the Security Council be written off as merely the
rejection of true "multilateralism" in favor of pursuing "simultaneous" bilateral
(bilaterally, but with multiple parties) pure-power diplomacy in New York. On
the contrary, even as the pursuit of naked national interest, such diplomacy at
the Security Council still has the virtue, at least by comparison to alternatives, of
being conducted relatively in public and in a setting in which other countries on
the Council (and not just permanent members) are able to take part in the
debate. Even when reduced to power politics, the Security Council is still far
more transparent and open to diplomatic intervention by third parties than truly
closed bilateral discussions.
There is much to regret if this move to increasingly competitive Great
Powers were to come to pass, at least in the form this Article has taken by
assumption. Losers almost certainly would include places in which Great Power
indifference to local power politics would otherwise have permitted UN
collective security to make a positive difference in the establishment and
maintenance of basic order. Let us hope that these dynamics do not undermine
the generally positive trend of UN peacekeeping or derail the possibilities of the
UN Peacebuilding Commission. Losers might also include-likewise a gravely
dismaying thought-current efforts toward enshrining the so-called
"responsibility to protect" that would, under circumstances of grave and massive
violations of human rights, permit under international law outside intervention
to protect populations even against the wishes of a sovereign state.6' Proponents
61 See generally Edward C. Luck, The United Nations and the Responsibifi to Protect, Stanley Foundation
(Aug 2008), available online at
<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/pubications/pab/LuckPAB808.pdf> (visited Apr 22,
2009); Rachel Davis, Benjamin Majekodunmi, and Judy Smith-H6hn, Prevention of Genodde and
Mass Atroities and the Re~ponsibili~y to Protect: Challenges for the UN and the International Community in the
21st Century, International Peace Institute (une 2008), available online at
<http://www.responsibilihttoprotect.org/index.php/featured-reports/1743> (visited Apr 22,
Summer 2009
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point to its inclusion in the 2005 UN General Assembly final document on UN
reform; skeptics point to the fact that the language refers to the authority of the
Security Council.
Other institutions are also taking note of the possible shifts and are
responding. Thus, for example, the recent and quite remarkable European Court
of Justice ("ECJ") ruling that, the Charter notwithstanding, the Security
Council's resolutions under its binding power are not binding after all and
subject to the rulings of institutions such as the ECJ itself.62 One may safely
expect that a Security Council more driven by competitive Great Power politics
will generate more, and more insistent, legal reconstructions from without,
aimed at showing that the Security Council does not have the final juridical word
in international peace and security, after all.
2009) (exploring the responsibility to protect doctrine and the evolution of the doctrine in the
international community); General Assembly Res No 60/1, UN Doc A/Res/60/1 at 138-40
(2005).
62 Kadi & Al Barakaat Intl Found v Coundl & Comn, Joined Cases C-402/05, C-415/05, available
online at <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/ol-6308/curia> (visited Apr 22, 2009). See
generally Grainne De Burca, The EU, the European Court ofJustce and the International Legal Order after
Kadi, 51 Harv Int LJ 1 (2009).
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